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PETITION AND CERTIFICATION 
Reeves petition for rehearing solely on the ground that the 
Court failed to explicitly state an award of attorney fees on 
appeal under Utah Code Annot. section 38-1-18. Counsel certifies, 
by his signature below, that this petition is filed in good faith 
and not for delay. A copy of the Court's opinion is attached. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT FAILED TO AWARD THE REEVES ATTORNEY FEES, WHICH REEVES 
HAD REQUESTED IN THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS. 
On May 10, 1995, the Reeves filed a motion to dismiss with 
this Court. The substance of that motion was that plaintiff-
appellee's (Steinfeldt) appeal was untimely filed. In the 
memorandum supporting the motion to dismiss Reeves specifically 
requested attorney fees under U.C.A. section 38-1-18. 
On May 30, 1995, this Court ruled that disposition of the 
motion would be deferred for plenary consideration. The issues in 
the motion were the same as those briefed by the parties, and were 
the same issues on which the Court ultimately ruled. 
The Court did not in its opinion expressly award the Reeves 
attorney fees. There is no question that under the statute award 
of attorney fees on appeal is mandatory, not discretionary. See 
Richards v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 612 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993)(attorney fees on appeal were awarded); Govert Copier 
Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(same). 
Reeves have made an affirmative request for fees. They did so 
in their motion, which was disposed of in the opinion. The Reeves 
request in this petition that the award of fees be expressly stated 
in the Court's opinion. 
DATED this /JK day of February, 1996, 
PHILLIP^,) LOWRY>-£br: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were hand-delivered to the following this :25z day of 
February, 1995. q^ 
William M. Jeffs, Esq. 
Jeffs & Jeffs 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
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This opinion is subject to revision before PPR 1 S 1996 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Shawn F. Reeves and Julie N. 
Reeves, 
Plaintiffs, Appellees, 
and Cross-appellants, 
v. 
Thad B. Steinfeldt dba 
Steinfeldt Construction, 
Defendant, Appellant, and 
Cross-appellee. 
OPINION 
[For Official Publication) 
Case No. 950132-CA 
F I L E D 
(February 15, 1996) 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable Ray M. Harding 
Attorneys: William M. Jeffs, Provo, for Appellant 
D. David Lambert and Phillip E. Lowry, Provo, for 
Appellees 
Before Judges Orme, Davis, and Billings. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
This is an appeal from a judgment determining appellant/ 
cross-appellee Steinfeldt improperly filed a mechanics' lien 
against property owned by appellees/cross-appellants the Reeves 
and awarding the Reeves an offset from the amount they owed 
Steinfeldt under their construction contract. As a threshold 
matter, we must determine whether Steinfeldt's notice of appeal 
was timely filed, and therefore, whether we have jurisdiction. 
We conclude it was not and dismiss Steinfeldt's appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction. We therefore only reach the merits of the 
Reeves' cross-appeal, which we reverse in part and affirm in 
part. 
FACTS 
The Reeves owned real property in Lindon, Utah, upon which 
they constructed a home. Steinfeldt acted as their general 
contractor. Steinfeldt failed to complete the work as promised, 
and the Reeves were forced to hire others to complete 
construction of the home. The Reeves had made all payments owing 
Steinfeldt under their agreement through October 1993. On 
November 5, 1993, Steinfeldt filed a mechanics' lien against the 
property in the amount of $17,929. As a result of this 
mechanics' lien, the Reeves were required to escrow 150% of the 
lien amount to close their long-term financing. To meet this 
additional escrow demand, the Reeves drew on their line of credit 
with Security Pacific Professional Services (Security Pacific) in 
the amount of $16,500, and borrowed the remainder of the required 
escrow from a business owned by Mr. Reeves. On December 22, 
1993, Steinfeldt filed an amended lien, reducing his claim to 
$12,764.19. A portion of the escrowed funds were thereafter 
released to the Reeves. 
The Reeves filed suit against Steinfeldt, claiming 
Steinfeldt wrongfully filed his mechanics' lien and requesting an 
offset for the replacement labor necessitated by Steinfeldt's 
failure to complete the construction and for the cost of 
escrowing additional funds. 
On October 17, 1994, after a bench trial, the trial court 
issued a Memorandum Decision, concluding Steinfeldt had filed a 
premature, excessive lien. The court therefore awarded the 
Reeves offset damages for the cost of finishing construction, the 
cost of escrowing monies for the lien, and attorney fees. The 
trial court directed the Reeves' counsel to prepare an 
appropriate order. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
On October 25, Steinfeldt filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
with the trial court, requesting the court to reconsider its 
October 17 ruling. The trial court did not rule on this motion 
until after a final judgment had been signed and entered. 
On October 27, the Reeves' counsel sent Steinfeldt a copy of 
"Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment." On November 4, in compliance with Rule 4-504(2) of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration,1 the Reeves presented a 
:Rule 4-504(2) provides: 
Copies of proposed findings, judgments, 
and orders shall be served upon opposing 
counsel before being presented to the court 
for signature unless the court otherwise 
orders. Notice of objections shall be 
submitted to the court and counsel within 
five days after service. 
(continued...) 
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copy of the Proposed Findings, Conclusions, and Judgments to the 
trial court. The signed findings and judgment were entered in 
the court's docket on November 7. 
Unaware that judgment had been entered, on November 8, 
Steinfeldt sent the Reeves his objections to the proposed 
findings and judgment.' On November 9, the Reeves sent 
Steinfeldt notice of the judgment. Steinfeldt thereafter filed 
an Ex Parte Motion for an Extension to File an Appeal, which the 
trial court granted on December 2. 
On December 8, the trial court issued a second Memorandum 
Decision denying Steinfeldt's Motion for Reconsideration and his 
Objections to the Reeves' Proposed Findings, Conclusions, and 
Judgment and directing the Reeves to prepare an appropriate 
order. The trial court signed that order on January 3, 1995. 
Steinfeldt filed a Notice of Appeal on December 27, 1994. 
The Reeves filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on January 11, 1995. 
ANALYSIS 
Jurisdiction 
On appeal, the Reeves contend that under Rule 4(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Steinfeldt's Notice of Appeal 
was untimely because it was filed before entry of the trial 
court's order denying Steinfeldt's post-judgment motion objecting 
to the proposed findings and conclusions. Conversely, Steinfeldt 
claims that neither his motion nor his objections constituted 
post-judgment motions under Rules 52 or 5 9 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and therefore his appeal was timely. Steinfeldt 
also contends the Reeves' cross-appeal should be dismissed as 
untimely as it was filed more than fourteen days after 
Steinfeldt's own notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 4(d). 
In pertinent part, Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure provides with our emphasis: 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and 
order. In a case in which an appeal is 
1
 (...continued) 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4-504(2). 
2Pursuant to Rule 4-504, discussed supra. Steinfeldt's 
objections, which were filed nine days after Steinfeldt's receipt 
of the proposed findings and judgment, were not timely. 
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permitted as a matter of right from the trial 
court to the appellate court, the notice of 
appeal . . . shall be filed with the clerk of 
the trial court within 30 days after the date 
of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. . . . 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If 
a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is filed in the trial court by any 
party . . . under Rule 52 (b) to amend or make 
additional findings of fact, whether or not 
an alteration of the judgment would be 
required if the motion is granted; [ ] under 
Rule 5 9 to alter or amend the judgment; or 
[ ] under Rule 5 9 for a new trial, the time 
for appeal for all parties shall run from the 
entry of the order denying a new trial or 
granting or denying any other such motion. . 
. . A notice <?f Appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall 
have riQ effect, A new notice of appeal must 
be filed within the prescribed time measured 
from the entry of the order of the trial 
court disposing of the motion as provided 
above. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a 
timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, 
any other party may file a notice of appeal 
within 14 days after the date on which the 
first notice of appeal was filed, or within 
the ime otherwise prescribed by paragraph 
(a) of this rule, whichever period last 
expires. 
DeBry v. Fidelity National Title Insurance Co.. 828 P.2d 520 
(Utah App. 1992) is extremely helpful in resolving this 
jurisdictional question. In DeBry. as in this case, this court 
was asked to determine whether a notice of appeal was timely 
where post-judgment motions were filed and considered by the 
court. Id. at 521-22. The facts of DeBry are strikingly similar 
to those before us. 
On March 28, 1990, the trial court granted Fidelity's motion 
for summary judgment, dismissing the DeBrys' complaint. The 
court thereafter directed Fidelity to prepare and submit proposed 
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findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in conformity 
with the court's ruling. Fidelity hand-delivered to the DeBrys' 
counsel a copy of the proposed findings and judgment on April 24. 
On May 2, Fidelity submitted the proposed findings, conclusions, 
and judgment to the trial court. The trial court signed and the 
clerk entered the findings, conclusions, and judgment that same 
day. On May 7, twelve days after their receipt of the proposed 
findings and five days after entry of judgment, the DeBrys filed 
a document entitled "Plaintiffs' Objections and Additions to 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." In that 
document, the DeBrys objected to various findings and conclusions 
and argued that specific additional findings and conclusions 
should be made by the trial court. Thereafter, on May 22, the 
DeBrys filed a notice of appeal "from the order granting summary 
judgment . . . entered . . . on May 2, 1990." On November 16, 
Fidelity mailed the DeBrys a copy of a proposed order denying the 
DeBrys' objections and additions. The trial court signed the 
order on December 11, stating "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
Plaintiffs' motion pursuant to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to amend the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law be and is hereby denied." Id. Following entry of this 
order, the DeBrys did not file a new notice of appeal. 
On appeal, the DeBrys argued their objections and additions 
to the proposed findings, conclusions, and judgment was not a 
Rule 52 motion. Specifically, the DeBrys contended the document 
did not constitute a "motion" per se, reasoning that it was an 
objection and not a post-judgment motion. Id. Thus, the DeBrys 
claimed that Rule 4(b) did not bar their notice of appeal and 
that this court therefore had jurisdiction to hear their appeal. 
In concluding that the DeBrys' notice of appeal was not timely 
filed, this court stated: "In determining whether the [trial] 
court properly characterized DeBrys' document, we look to the 
document's substance rather than its caption." Id. We continued 
that regardless of its caption, "a motion filed within ten days 
of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of the 
court's findings and conclusions is properly treated as a post-
judgment motion under either Rules 52(b) or 59(e)." Id. at 522-
23. This court concluded that, in substance, the DeBrys' motion 
requested the trial court to amend and make additional findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, and thus was a Rule 52 
post-judgment motion. Moreover, this court held that, because 
the trial court can still alter or amend its judgment or findings 
and conclusions under Rules 50, 52, and 59, "a notice of appeal 
is of no effect if filed prior to the disposition of a post-
judgment motion." l<j. at 523; flcggyd Bailey v. Sound Lab. Inc.. 
694 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1984); see also Swenson Assocs. 
Architects v. Division of Facilities Constr.. 889 P.2d 415, 417 
(Utah 1994) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction appeal filed 
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after entry of signed minute entry but before entry of final 
order). 
In the instant case, the Reeves claim, and we agree, that 
Steinfeldt's November 8 Objections to the Proposed Findings, 
Conclusions, and Judgment is in substance a Rule 59 motion, 
inasmuch as it asks the court to alter its findings and to amend 
its conclusions and judgment.' In this motion, Steinfeldt 
objects to the trial court's calculation of damages and the 
naming of a prevailing party in the underlying action. He 
asserts the trial court incorrectly determined the issues of 
substantial completion and whether Steinfeldt's lien had been 
wrongfully filed. Steinfeldt's motion does more than merely the 
object to Reeves' proposed findings and judgment. It urges the 
court to amend its findings and to alter its legal conclusions 
and judgment. Thus, the time for filing a notice of appeal was 
tolled until January 3, when the trial court denied this motion.4 
We therefore must dismiss Steinfeldt's appeal because it was 
filed before January 3, the date of the court's final order, and 
because Steinfeldt failed to file a new notice of appeal after 
that date.' 
3We need not reach the issue of the status of the October 27 
motion filed post-memorandum decision, but pre-judgment. Even if 
we were to conclude that this motion was something other than the 
"functional equivalent" to a Rule 59 motion, this is of no help 
to Steinfeldt. His subsequent motion tolled the time for the 
filing of an appeal, see DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'1 Title Ins. Co.. 
828 P.2d 520, 522 (Utah 1992), and thus invalidated his premature 
notice of appeal. 
furthermore, Steinfeldt's motion to extend the time for 
filing an appeal has no effect on this jurisdictional issue. 
Steinfeldt filed and was granted an extension of time to appeal 
the November 7 findings, conclusion, and judgment. Steinfeldt's 
subsequent post-judgment motion made the November 7 judgment 
irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes. 
5In Workman v. Naale Construction. Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 751 
(Utah App. 1990), this court held that failure to give notice of 
entry of judgment does not invalidate a judgment; rather it is a 
factor for the court to consider in ruling on post-judgment 
motions. In the instant case, Steinfeldt insists that his 
failure to receive notice of entry of judgment in a timely manner 
should likewise be considered a factor in determining the 
substance of his post-judgment objections. He contends that -
because the Reeves did not mail Notice of Entry of Judgment until 
five days after the trial judge had signed the Proposed Findings, 
(continued...) 
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The Reeves' cross-appeal is, however, timely as it was filed 
in compliance with both subsections (a) and (b) of Rule 4 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requiring that notice of 
appeal be filed within thirty days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from. 
As with post-judgment motions, we look to the substance of a 
notice of appeal and not its caption. For this reason, because 
Steinfeldt's notice of appeal is dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction, we view the Reeves' notice not as a Notice of 
Cross-Appeal but as a Notice of Appeal. In so ruling, we note 
that a party wishing to appeal is required to file a notice of 
appeal with the trial court. Likewise, a party wishing to file a 
cross-appeal also must file a notice with the trial court. 
Moreover, there is no difference in the filing fee paid. 
Further, if both parties had filed a notice of appeal, we would 
merely designate the second notice as a notice of cross-appeal 
5(...continued) 
Conclusions, and Judgment--one day after Steinfeldt filed his 
objections with the trial court--this court cannot construe his 
objections as a Rule 5 9 motion and should deem his notice of 
appeal filed the date the order denying his motion was signed. 
See Utah R. App. P. 4(c). 
This argument overlooks important considerations regarding 
constructive notice and Steinfeldt's own failure to adhere to 
judicial rules. First, a party to a lawsuit is on constructive 
notice of the contents of the court record and has a duty to be 
aware of what the trial court does. In the instant case, 
although he had not yet received notice of entry of judgment, 
Steinfeldt was chargeable with such notice. 
Moreover, under Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration, a party has five days after receipt of proposed 
findings and judgments to file an objection. The Reeves mailed 
Steinfeldt a copy of their proposed findings on October 27. 
Allowing three days for mailing, Steinfeldt's objections would 
have to have been received by the trial court by 5:00 p.m. on 
November 4. Steinfeldt did not file his objections until four 
days later, on November 8. It was incumbent upon Steinfeldt to 
determine whether judgment had been signed and entered before 
lodging his objections before the trial court. Thus, he cannot 
complain on appeal that his failure to learn of the judgment or 
to timely file his objections is the result of the Reeves' 
failure to provide an adequate notice of judgment. Furthermore, 
Steinfeldt received notice of the entry of the judgment and thus 
was aware that his prior motion was, in fact, a post-judgment 
motion. He therefore should have been aware that the time to 
file an appeal was tolled until the court denied this post-
judgment motion, and that he must file a second notice of appeal. 
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for briefing purposes. See Utah R. App. P. 24(g). We therefore 
determine wr.ather the Reeves' Notice of Appeal is timely under 
Rule 4(a). As the Reeves' notice was filed eight days after the 
trial court's order denying Steinfeldt's objections—well within 
the thirty days set forth by rule--it is properly before this 
court. See Utah R. App P. 4(a). 
CROSS-APPEAL 
In their cross-appeal, the Reeves argue the trial court 
erred when it awarded them only $403 as the cost of escrowing 
additional funds and failed to award them separate damages for 
the delay in closing caused by Steinfeldt's wrongful conduct. 
Whether the trial court erred in calculating the amount of 
damages or in failing to award the Reeves separate damages for 
the delay in closing, presents a question of fact which this 
court will not overturn unless it is clearly erroneous. See Utah 
R. Civ. P. 52 (a) . 
In its Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact, the trial 
court awarded the Reeves "$4 03 in interest for the monies they 
were forced to escrow in this matter." * The Reeves assert the 
proper damages supported by the record is $1,842.20, noting the 
$403 figure reflects the cost of the delay in closing created by 
Steinfeldt's premature lien. 
The testimony of cross-appellant Mr. Reeves regarding these 
damages was unchallenged at trial. In relevant part, Mr. Reeves 
testified: 
Q [Reeves' counsel] And have you then 
attempted to calculate the interest 
differential between the amount that you had 
financed on your construction loan at the 
construction loan rate compared to the same 
amount at the long-term financing rate for 
those ten days that you were delayed in 
closing? 
A Yes, we have. And the one 
[construction loan rate] was a base plus two, 
which would be six [percent] plus two was 
eight [percent]. And our long-term [rate] 
was four and an eighth [percent]. The eight 
days of interest [due to the delay in 
closing] came to approximately $403. 
Q With respect to the cost of having 
to escrow the money at Security Title 
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Company, have you attempted to calculate that 
based on Exhibit No. 20 [copies of payment 
records for the money borrowed to meet the 
escrow demand]? 
A Yes, we have. This was a little 
more confusing because it's a variable rate 
signature loan, and every month the rate can 
change. And it goes anywhere from 
12.9 [percent] to 13.9 [percent] to 
14.6 [percent] . Just taking an average and 
estimating it, it came out to about 
$1,842.20, the finance charge we paid. 
Q Now, that's just what you paid to 
Security Pacific; correct? 
A Yes. . . . 
Q You also borrowed additional monies 
besides what is reflected on Exhibit 20; 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Approximately another $10,000 from 
your business? 
A Yeah. . . . 
Q But I'm just talking about the 
amount that's -- the Security Pacific was for 
16,500; correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And so the interest that you've 
stated is just on the amount that you 
borrowed from a commercial lender? 
A. That's correct. I didn't charge 
any interest from my business. 
It is clear the trial court sought to award the Reeves 
damages for the interest they were assessed on the $16,500 
borrowed from Security Pacific. From a review of Mr. Reeves's 
testimony and the trial court's subsequent memorandum decision 
and judgment, it is apparent that the trial court simply used the 
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wrong figure. Based upon the record, we conclude the trial court 
erred when it awarded the Reeves only $4 03 as damages for the 
cost of having to escrow additional monies. The undisputed 
testimony at trial supports an award of $1,842.20 in set-off 
damages for the cost of escrowing additional monies. 
However, the trial court did not err by not awarding the 
Reeves additional damages (in the amount of $403) for the eight-
day delay in closing. While the Reeves presented evidence at 
trial regarding the costs of the eight-day delay, neither the 
Reeves' complaint nor the Reeves1 counsel in his closing argument 
specifically requested the trial court to award the Reeves 
separate damages for this delay. Moreover, prior to initiating 
this appeal, the Reeves never objected to the trial court's 
failure to award such damages.0 Because this issue was not 
properly preserved at trial, we decline to address it. West One 
Bank v. Life Ins. Co. of Va . . 887 P.2d 880, 882 n.l (Utah App. 
1994) . 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude Steinfeldt's notice of appeal was not timely 
filed and therefore dismiss Steinfeldt's appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. We hold, however, that the Reeves' notice of 
appeal, was timely filed and therefore we address the merits of 
that appeal. Accordingly, we find the trial court erred when it 
awarded the Reeves only $4 03 as damages for the cost of escrowing 
additional monies, concluding that from the uncontroverted 
testimony at trial, the Reeves suffered damages in the amount of 
$1,842.20. We therefore reverse and remand on the cross-appeal 
for the entry of the correct amount of damages. Finally, we 
decline to address the Reeves' claim that the trial court erred 
when it failed to also award the Reeves damages for the delay in 
6This is especially troubling in this case as it was the 
Reeves' counsel who prepared the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Judgment which the trial court signed. Thus, the Reeves 
were clearly on notice of the substance of the trial courtfs 
findings and judgment and therefore should have objected below in 
order to give the trial court an opportunity to reassess its 
ruling in light of the evidence before the court. 
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closing created by Steinfeldt's conduct, as that issue was not 
properly preserved at trial. 
Judith M.Billings,Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
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